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Algorithmic Management & App-Work in the Gig Economy:  
A Research Agenda for Employment Relations & HRM 
 
James Duggan*, Ultan Sherman, Ronan Carbery & Anthony McDonnell 




Current understanding of what constitutes work in the growing gig economy is heavily 
conflated, ranging from conceptualisations of independent contracting to other forms of 
contingent labour. This paper calls for a move away from problematic aggregations by 
proposing a classification of gig work into three variants, all based strongly upon key 
technological features: app-work, crowdwork, and capital platform work. Focusing specifically 
on the app-work variant, this paper’s more delineated focus on the textured dimensions of this 
work proposes new lines of enquiry into employment relationships and HRM. Examining the 
crucial role of algorithmic management, we critically discuss the impact of this novel mediation 
tool used by gig organisations for the nature of employment relations within app-work, work 
assignment processes and performance management. In so doing, we propose a series of 
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Working arrangements are increasingly precarious, with independent contracting and 
temporary work becoming more commonplace (Bonet, Cappelli & Hamori, 2013; Harvey, 
Rhodes, Vachhani & Williams, 2017). The emergence of the ‘gig economy’ – an economic 
system that uses online platforms to digitally connect workers, or ‘individual service-
providers’, with consumers – represents a new form of contingent labour (Harris, 2017). The 
‘gig’ business model bypasses many of the regular responsibilities and costs of employment, 
leading to widespread legal ambiguity, which has resulted in challenges as to whether workers 
should in fact be classified as employees (Collier, Dubal & Carter, 2017; Fabo, Karanovic & 
Dukova, 2017). Discourse around work in the gig economy, or ‘gig work’, traverses from the 
positive, with emphasis on the apparent autonomy and flexibility afforded to workers, to the 
negative, with critics viewing it as a means by which businesses lower costs and erode 
employment standards and labour regulation (Friedman, 2014; Stewart & Stanford, 2017).  
 
The gig economy is disruptive to our traditional understanding of work, as its digital on-
demand, or work-as-required, principle sees personnel, as subordinate workers, becoming 
increasingly disposable (Todolí-Signes, 2017). It produces less long-term jobs, as people are 
hired to complete hyper-flexible ‘gigs’, working to complete tasks for a defined, short period 
of time, often with low commitment existing between workers and organisations (Friedman, 
2014; Harvey et al., 2017). Gig workers tend to be classified as independent contractors, with 
the numbers legally employed by organisations operating in the gig economy significantly 
smaller (Todolí-Signes, 2017). For example, Uber, a prominent ‘ride-hailing’ or transportation 
gig organisation, currently has almost four million drivers across 700+ cities worldwide 
(Madrigal, 2019), but only legally employs 22,000 in total (Uber, 2019). Similarly, Lyft, 
another ride-hailing service, operates in 600+ locations across the US and Canada with almost 
two million drivers on the platform, but employs less than 5,000 (McNeill, 2019). Likewise, 
Deliveroo, a food-delivery company, has over 35,000 ‘riders’ in 200 cities but only directly 
employs an estimated 2,000 (Hurley, 2018).  
 
Across Europe, Eurofound (2017) estimate that the number of people engaging in gig work as 
their main labour market status makes up less than 0.5 per cent of all employment. The UK has 
the highest incidence of gig work within Europe, with estimates of 4.4 per cent, or 
approximately 2.8 million people, engaged in this form of work in 2017 (Lepanjuuri, Wishart 
& Cornick, 2018). Of these, 25 per cent reported that some form of gig work was their main 
job (Eurofound, 2017). Based on these figures, it is suggested that over 5 million people could 
be working in the UK’s gig economy by 2022 (Dupont, Hughes, Wolf & Wride, 2018). The 
United States appears similar to Europe, with figures of 0.5 per cent estimated to be 
participating in this form of work as of 2015 (Katz & Krueger, 2016). However, measuring the 
overall size of this new economy proves difficult because organisations are not obliged to 
publish figures, and most gig working arrangements fall outside existing capabilities of labour 
market measurement tools.1 Also, despite boasting large worker numbers, little is known 
regarding how many individuals regularly engage in this work, rather than being one-off or 
periodic workers.  
 
Uncertainty exists in respect to what gig work does and does not involve, with different forms 
of contingent labour commonly subsumed into gig classifications (Howcroft and Bergvall-
Kåreborn, 2019; Bernhardt & Thomason, 2017; Kuhn, 2016). This, we argue, is erroneous. 
Despite outward similarities with non-traditional forms of work, key differences exist that 
warrant specific consideration (e.g. number of parties involved and the influence of 
technology). Likewise, there is no one universal work classification or set of ‘rules’ that can 
be implemented in the gig economy. Individuals who occasionally boost income by renting out 
apartments on Airbnb, an online platform for property rental, are very different from those who 
make a living by working for ride-hailing or food-delivery services like Uber or Deliveroo 
(Rozzi, 2018). Again, each of these is strikingly different from crowdworking platforms, such 
as Amazon Mechanical Turk, that connect businesses with skilled freelance workers (Rozzi, 
2018). Because work and conditions are hugely individualised across platforms, employment 
relations and HRM implications along with policy and union responses will vary and need to 
be tailored accordingly. This paper’s first objective is to provide conceptual clarity on gig work 
by moving away from monolithic perspectives and differentiating it into three key variants: 
capital platform work; crowdwork; and app-work. This, we argue, enables a more textured 
understanding of the idiosyncratic nature of gig working arrangements (Liao, Wayne & 
 
1There is a lack of clarity as to what precisely gig work entails and this in turn means estimates of the size of the 
gig economy are difficult to corroborate and compare. Different estimates exist because of significant variation 
in definitions of what is included or excluded in the gig economy. Consequently, caution is necessary in 
interpreting the size, scope and spread of the gig economy.  
Rousseau, 2016). Accordingly, this conceptualisation of gig work provides the paper’s first 
contribution.  
 
The paper’s second objective is to examine the criticality of management-by-algorithm, a 
relatively novel and alternative means of utilising the influential role of technology to monitor, 
manage and control workers (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). By focusing on the app-work variant 
of gig work, our second contribution involves nuancing the key implications of algorithmic 
management for employment relations and HRM. Algorithmic management automates HR 
related duties and functions traditionally undertaken by human managers. Therefore, our app-
work focus stems from it being a gig work variant that is particularly problematic from an 
employment relations and HRM perspective, as evidenced by the burgeoning academic, 
practitioner and press narrative (e.g. widescale protests, debates and legal issues surrounding 
app-work organisations) (Schmidt, 2017; Stewart & Stanford, 2017; Tran & Sokas, 2017; 
Wright, Wailes, Bamber & Lansbury, 2017).  
 
The paper elucidates several research questions around the nature of employment relations and 
HRM responsibilities in app-work organisations. Given the relative infancy of academic 
enquiry on gig work, we argue that an appropriate point of departure is to examine the impact 
that algorithmic management has on the formation and development of the working 
relationship in the first instance. Gaining insight into the process through which workers 
establish a working relationship, as well as investigating how they adhere to and are managed 
by the algorithm’s instructions, holds the prospect of better understanding the intricacies of 
labour within app-work. Building on this, we identify several areas strongly impacted by 
algorithmic management, specifically the nature of employment relations, work assignment 
processes, and performance management procedures (Prassl, 2018; Rosenblat, 2018), as 
central strands of the proposed research agenda. 
 
2. Classifying & Distinguishing Gig Work 
 
Building on Wolfe (1941), many conceptualisations of the terms ‘work’ and ‘employment’ 
have been offered by legal and organisational scholars. These reflect the changing nature of 
working relationships and the emergence of non-standard forms of employment over time. 
Most point to the idea of an employee being ‘controlled’ by the organisation, ‘in the service’ 
of an ‘employer’, ‘directing’ the work process in exchange for ‘remuneration’, or the reciprocal 
obligations involved (Cappelli & Keller, 2013; Connelly & Gallagher, 2004; Schein, 1980). 
While researchers conceive of an employee in different ways, the means by which gig 
organisations view their workers has been controversial. In distancing themselves from legal 
responsibility towards ‘employees’, many gig organisations have adopted other monikers for 
worker classification (e.g. ‘taskers’ with TaskRabbit; ‘riders’ with Deliveroo). There are, 
however, several cases being taken by gig workers, with the support of unions, challenging the 
legal status of their employment (McGaughey, 2018).  
 
Working arrangements are traditionally classified as either ‘employment’ or ‘contract work’. 
Situating gig work in the literature on employment classifications, it is a hybrid of contingent 
work types (Kuhn, 2016). Figure 1 illustrates how gig working compares to other types of 
employment. It has obvious similarities to independent contracting (Carr, Hall, Mason & 
Varney, 2017) and forms of subcontracting with the involvement of at least three parties. Gig 
work also bears similarities to temporary employment, which is neither full-time nor open-
ended (Friedman, 2014); temporary agency work, which distributes work via third-party labour 
intermediaries (Ward, Grimshaw, Rubery & Beynon, 2001); and zero-hour contracts, where no 
guaranteed hours are offered (O’Sullivan et al., 2015). The precarity of these arrangements 
makes them comparable to aspects of gig work in terms of a lack of commitment to long-term 
relationships; flexible working hours; project-based work; and piece-rate payments. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The common denominator across all gig work, and a critical distinguishing feature from other 
contingent labour, is the presence of an intermediary in the form of a digital platform 
organisation. Digital platforms present a new way of organising work and offering services, 
functioning as online businesses that facilitate commercial interactions between at least two 
parties – workers and customers (Gramano, 2019). This enables the meeting between the 
worker and customer, and, in doing so, mediates this relationship (Gandini, 2018). Building on 
work by De Stefano (2016), this distinctive feature allows us to identify three different variants 
of gig work: capital platform work, crowdwork, and app-work.  
 
Capital platform work exists where individuals use a digital platform to sell goods peer-to-peer 
or to lease assets (e.g. Airbnb and Etsy). In this context, the role of the digital platform is to 
connect customers with a form of capital owned by an individual. The term ‘sharing economy’, 
often used interchangeably with the gig economy, is most closely associated with capital 
platform work. However, the critical distinction is that capital platform work relies on the 
‘sharing’ of underutilised assets, such as accommodation, for financial gain, rather than the 
completion of work (Schmidt, 2017). Consequently, the arrangement between capital platform 
workers and the gig organisation is more akin to an e-commerce or business-to-business 
relationship. This is sometimes referred to as a form of micro-entrepreneurship, in that these 
‘workers’ share greater similarity with small businesses than employees (Vandaele, 2018; 
Zervas, Proserpio & Byers, 2017).   
 
Contrastingly, crowdwork and app-work exist on platforms that allow workers to connect with 
customers to sell their services by performing tasks. Crowdwork refers to work-mediating 
digital platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk and Fiverr, through which workers 
remotely complete tasks (De Stefano, 2016). In a typical crowdworking scenario, an 
organisation or individual posts a task or project to be completed via a platform. Tasks can 
range from software coding, to survey completion, to audio transcription. Any potential 
number of contributors can attempt to undertake the task from any geographic location, with 
the most suitable crowdworkers selected (Berg, 2016). On some crowdworking platforms, 
individuals may work simultaneously on the same task, with the customer selecting and paying 
for only the best product (De Stefano, 2016). Different crowdwork platforms set minimum 
compensation for certain tasks, whilst others let the compensation be set by their requester. In 
other cases, no clear relationship exists between the customer and the worker: they complete 
the task autonomously and are paid by the platform, which then provides the result to the 
customer. Crowdwork has proved popular for both workers and customers. For example, 
figures show that 10,000 new tasks are published and 7,500 are completed per hour on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (Berg, 2016). 
 
While crowdwork is generally conceptualised as one form of work, it can be subdivided into 
four distinct types.  Cloud-based crowdwork is where tasks can be completed remotely via 
the Internet. If the task is not given to a specific individual but to an undefined group of people 
online, it is crowdwork. If the task is further subdivided into smaller units for piecemeal work, 
with each individual remunerated with an equally small amount of money, it is micro-tasking 
crowdwork. If tasks cannot be subdivided but work is carried out simultaneously, by a large 
group of individuals, while in the end only one result is used and paid for, it is contest-based 
crowdwork (Schmidt, 2017). However, as all types of crowdwork allow for the completion of 
tasks remotely, thereby lacking a discernible employer, we argue that it is less likely that these 
workers will develop a transparent working relationship with the gig organisation (Berg, 2016). 
 
The third variant of gig work, app-work, refers to service-providing intermediary digital 
platform organisations (or ‘apps’) that utilise workers to perform tasks locally (e.g. transport, 
food-delivery) for customers who pay for these services, with the organisation retaining a 
percentage of the exchange (De Stefano, 2016). An app (short for ‘application’) is a software 
program designed to perform a specific function directly for the user on mobile devices, most 
typically smartphones (Dickinson, Ghali, Cherrett, Speed, Davies & Norgate, 2014). App-work 
is a form of labour wherein the offering of traditional working activities in local markets is 
conducted through apps, managed by intermediary digital platform organisations, that 
intervene in setting minimum quality standards of service and in the selection and management 
of individuals who perform the work. Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn (2019) suggest that 
app-work is a distinct form of crowdwork (which they combine with capital platform work and 
label as “asset-based services”).  We, however, argue that when work is to be completed locally 
at a specific location and time, by an assigned worker who is managed and subjected to 
minimum performance standards by a single intermediary digital platform, it is wholly 
distinctive to crowdwork.  In app-work, an algorithm quickly identifies and offers labour to 
one person; whereas in capital-platform work and crowdwork, it is the customer or requester 
who decides and selects whose services to pay for.  
 
The speed at which the working relationship is created in app-work is strikingly unique. That 
is, many workers are hired almost instantly once they have agreed to the terms and conditions 
set out in the app and uploaded the relevant documentation (e.g. driving licence, proof of 
identity, etc.). Within some digital platform organisations, individuals must electronically 
accept the platform’s terms each time they pursue work opportunities or gigs – in the case of 
an Uber driver, for example, they must accept the associated terms and conditions each time 
they log in to the app (Tran & Sokas, 2017). Consequently, app-work participants may, over 
time, develop a working relationship with digital platform organisations, due to the agentic 
relationship being more transparent.   
 
App-work relationships are generally not rooted in traditional employee–employer dyads, but 
rather involve multiple parties contributing to the dynamic exchange agreement. Trilateral, and 
sometimes quadrilateral, relations exist in app-working arrangements. For example, Deliveroo 
describes itself as offering a service that links workers with partner restaurants to provide a 
food-delivery service to customers (Deliveroo, 2018). A customer uses the Deliveroo app to 
order food from a participating restaurant or supplier. The app notifies the restaurant, which 
prepares the order. At the same time, the app notifies a registered courier or worker that a 
delivery from the restaurant to the customer is required. Thus, the four italicised parties indicate 
that this is a multi-party working relationship. Indeed, all app-work involves a minimum of 
three parties, with platforms facilitating and mediating transactions between workers, 
customers, and occasionally suppliers (e.g. partner restaurants, in the case of Deliveroo). These 
multiple parties are illustrated in Figure 2. It is the app that connects and directs each party in 
the work arrangement, thereby functioning as a centralised mechanism governing the dynamics 
of this working relationship. The next section explores the algorithmic architecture of apps and 
the extent to which it manages app-workers who utilise platforms. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
3. Algorithmic Management and App-Work 
 
Technology is changing how organisations manage work. The management practices found in 
app-work arrangements borrow extensively from how digital media platforms, such as 
Facebook and Netflix, manage and influence their users. An algorithm is a computational 
formula that autonomously makes decisions based on statistical models or decision rules 
without explicit human intervention (Eurofound, 2018). It is a sequence of instructions telling 
a computer what to do within a set of precisely defined steps and rules designed to accomplish 
a task. However, instead of repeatedly processing a stable set of consistent instructions, 
algorithms rewrite themselves as they work. Technological advances have allowed 
organisations to utilise artificial intelligence that simultaneously learn and solve problems in 
increasingly complicated domains, from creating products to autonomously managing business 
processes (Mann & O’Neil, 2016). Algorithms are presented as objectively and mathematically 
correct and, as a result, people trust and abide by them (Lee, Kusbit, Metsky & Dabbish, 2015). 
However, Jago (2019) finds that people believe technological agents lack the same level of 
moral authenticity as human agents. Algorithms increasingly make decisions that have tended 
to be the remit of managers and HR professionals. On hiring platforms such as LinkedIn, 
algorithms sort through thousands of profiles to recommend promising job candidates to 
company recruiters (Carey & Smith, 2016). Likewise, in the gig economy, algorithms match 
customers or requestors with workers (Lee et al., 2015), and also function to evaluate worker 
performance on many platforms (Rosenblat, 2018). 
 
Management-by-algorithm, or algorithmic management, is commonplace within app-work. 
We define algorithmic management as a system of control where self-learning algorithms are 
given the responsibility for making and executing decisions affecting labour, thereby limiting 
human involvement and oversight of the labour process. It replaces some of the tasks and 
processes that workers typically engage with by using algorithms that are developed by the 
very same individuals’ data on the platform. Consequently, workers and consumers contribute, 
unremunerated, to the stock of intangible capital of the platform. This has seen stratospheric 
valuations placed on app-work platforms such as Lyft, valued at $24 billion at IPO in 2019 
despite losing over $900 million in 2018 (Ovide, 2019). 
 
For app-workers specifically, algorithms embedded within digital platforms govern the rules 
used to select and manage labour when facilitating a transaction between a customer and 
worker (see Figure 2). A key feature of app-work platforms is the automatic coordination and 
matching of the transaction through a set of advanced algorithms, creating a space where 
supply and demand integrate through automatic management and enforced mechanisms 
(Lehdonvirta, 2018). In other words, platforms use algorithms to match supply-and-demand in 
the market, while also mediating and closely monitoring the work performed (Gandini, 2018). 
The use of algorithms allows platforms to track workers’ movements and assign work using 
workers’ smartphone-based GPS systems. Algorithms are used to undertake typical HR 
processes like work assignment and performance management without the need for face-to-
face interaction. Within this context of HR processes, a particularly apposite question concerns 
the creation of the app itself. Certainly, as digital platform organisations continue to expand, 
marketing specialists, system designers, programmers and data scientists are recruited to work 
exclusively on these platforms (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). These core staff are effectively 
responsible for the design, maintenance and development of the app. In the absence of HR 
professionals to coordinate app-workers, policies for recruiting, monitoring and managing 
workers are mainly developed by these core staff (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). In many ways, 
then, their role in the organisation is akin to a rudimentary HR function, as the platform that 
they are responsible for overseeing manages the working arrangement for app-workers. 
 
Algorithmic management keeps marginal and labour costs relatively low (Schmidt, 2017), with 
considerable savings stemming from platforms functioning as virtual automated managers, 
thus negating the need for human supervisors and managers (Lee et al., 2015). App-workers 
are typically managed via tracking mechanisms and customer ratings, thus forming one of the 
fundamental principles of the gig economy in that most core HR processes (i.e. the assignment 
of tasks, performance evaluation) are fulfilled by one of the two groups of users, the worker or 
the customer, through the medium of the app-work platform (Schmidt, 2017).  For example, 
Uber and Lyft drivers are not directly supervised, nor are they required to wear a uniform or 
display organisational signage in their vehicles. However, the platforms have been known to 
provide drivers with precise instructions on cleanliness of their workspace, how to behave with 
customers, and guidelines for maintaining proper hygiene (Steinberger, 2018). Likewise, both 
platforms monitor the quality of work based on anonymous customer ratings (Steinberger, 
2018). 
 
Algorithmic management tracks, disciplines and sets expectations for workers without human 
supervision or recourse, often potentially to the detriment of workers’ social protection 
(Vandaele, 2018). Through its very purpose, algorithmic management eliminates the more 
interpersonal and empathetic aspects of people management. Without an organisational partner 
advocating their needs and maintaining a balanced working relationship (Gilbert, De Winne & 
Sels, 2011), app-workers may lose trust and confidence, resulting in a reduced sense of well-
being. As a means of exerting control, algorithms essentially automate management practice. 
This, however, does not extend to protecting workers or facilitating their supposed autonomy: 
platforms determine the eligibility of workers (e.g. the newness of vehicles is a factor in 
working with Uber and Lyft); some platforms allow workers to rate customers, but these ratings 
rarely influence customers’ ability to use the platform; and levels of demand and time-pressures 
across many platforms mean workers have less choice to work entirely on their own schedules 
(Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). Algorithmic management also extends to pay, with many app-work 
platforms allowing workers to operate wherever they want. The platform then relies on 
‘economic nudges’ (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016) in the form of algorithmically determined surge-
pricing (Gandini, 2018) – called ‘boosts’ – to entice workers to areas of high demand, a process 
Woodcock & Johnson (2018) term ‘gamification-from-above’. 
 
The disparity that exists between those who design the app and those who physically provide 
the service it sells, and between those who offer the infrastructure for labour but no stability or 
benefits to accompany it, are a defining feature of many app-work platforms. Algorithmic 
management therefore facilitates asymmetric information in the working relationship by 
controlling the supply of labour, targeting different workers with variable incentives, removing 
workers from platforms without remedy, and mediating disputes at its discretion. Slee (2017) 
compares facets of the algorithmic management structure to the ‘boss from hell’, describing it 
as erratic and bad-tempered with the potential to fire workers on a whim with no recourse to 
appeal. The nascent literature is gradually addressing algorithmic management and control, but 
considerable knowledge gaps remain in terms of the employment relations and HRM 
implications of this approach, to which we now turn. 
 
4. App-Work’s Implications for Employment Relations and HRM: A Research Agenda 
 
Algorithmic management, as one of the defining features of app-work, significantly impacts 
on the functioning of the working relationship. While the relationship initially appears to be an 
entirely transactional, economic exchange, recent research on the nuances of app-working 
arrangements signals the potential existence of a more complex, textured psychological 
contract, wherein app-workers view their association with the digital platform organisation in 
a broader, more relational sense (Ashford, Barker Caza & Reid, 2018). For instance, some app-
workers are reported as seeking professional development opportunities from organisations 
(Graham, Hjorth and Lehdonvirta, 2017), social interaction and support from colleagues and 
managers, and mentoring from more senior colleagues (Ashford et al., 2018). This aligns with 
emerging research on the psychological contract, which calls for a ‘multi-foci’ perspective to 
better understand the individualised nature of contemporary working arrangements (Alcover, 
Rico, Turnley & Bolino, 2017). This indicates that modern working relationships, like those 
found in app-work, are not simply based on an agreement between two parties, but are instead 
derived from the multiple parties in the employment network.  
 
Of course, one of the parties in this working arrangement is the app itself, which, as explained, 
is controlled by the organisation and utilises algorithmic management. Organisations do not 
have psychological contracts, but their human agents do (Rousseau, 1995). When one examines 
employment relationships in app-work, the agency question becomes especially apposite. 
Emerging research highlights that Uber drivers successfully make demands of the app in terms 
of encouraging and facilitating tipping from customers (Riesman, 2014, Kuhn & Maleki, 
2017), or improved performance ratings for engaging in citizenship behaviour (e.g. returning 
a passenger’s lost item) (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Likewise, Ravenelle (2019) argues that the 
capricious nature of apps may impact workers’ experiences of psychological contract violation 
or fulfilment. Findings like this support the argument that the app-worker, in part at least, may 
develop expectations, even if the digital platform organisation rejects any notion of individual 
workers being employees. 
 
Despite this, the fragmented nature of app-work, through its reliance on technology via digital 
platforms and governing algorithms, may erode the reciprocity found in traditional 
employment relationships. Therefore, app-work challenges our understanding of HRM 
concepts and practices. Certainly, it is evident that established practices such as employment 
relations, work assignment processes, and performance management exist in the app-work 
context. However, the overall approach towards HRM appears to differ significantly from 
established models, both in the context of its strategic purpose and the way in which activities 
are delivered and implemented.  
 
App-work seems to pass the risks of employment almost entirely onto individual workers, 
predicated by the organisational view that these workers are independent, self-employed 
contractors. Thus, on the surface, the denial of employment status and associated rights for 
app-workers indicates little relevance for HRM as a profession and function. However, with 
multiple court rulings making determinations in favour of individual workers gaining 
employment status, HRM naturally becomes increasingly relevant. Notwithstanding this, we 
highlight that HRM practices are implemented for app-workers, despite the lack of an official 
HR function. We now critically discuss several of these key areas of HR practice, commencing 
with considering the nature of employment relations in app-work, and, in so doing, outline 
worthwhile research questions for future scholarly enquiry.  
 
4.1 Employment Relations 
As the term implies, the centrality of the ‘app’ in app-working relationships is absolute. That 
the algorithm underpinning the app is designed, developed and implemented heavily or entirely 
by marketing specialists and system designers within organisations, with little, if any, worker 
contribution, challenges established thought on the HR function’s role in effectively managing 
working relationships (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). While gig organisations have a HR 
function, this largely serves the core staff (i.e. employees) of these firms, rather than app-
workers. This raises many challenges around the existence of an employment relationship and 
its dynamics, while also raising questions for the future role of the HR function within the gig 
economy’s business model. 
 
A heavily transactional relationship appears to be at the heart of app-work, with workers paid 
for the quantity of work undertaken rather than the time spent working. The seemingly non-
existent focus on the development of mutual trust and commitment in the working relationship 
further solidifies the transactional nature of this exchange. At the recruitment stage, most roles 
are advertised on the basis that workers have the autonomy to work when they wish with 
considerable independence, indicating that there are little or no expectations of a long-term 
relationship unless desired (Jabagi, Croteau, Audebrand & Marsan, 2019). Likewise, workers 
are typically onboarded quickly, via a prompt screening process, ensuring a readily accessible 
source of labour for the organisation (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). While this approach to 
onboarding workers certainly reduces costs by eliminating many of the labour and time costs 
involved (Healy, Nicholson & Pekarek, 2017), it may prove problematic when looking beyond 
short-term, transactional cost benefits towards recruiting motivated workers who are likely to 
succeed in roles. Traditionally, organisations seek to strategically identify workers who ‘fit’ 
well with the organisation, as a means of improving and sustaining performance in the long-
term (Ahmad & Schroeder, 2002). Fit theory argues that workers who recognise that their 
values align with those of the organisation are more likely to be intrinsically motivated, which, 
in turn, impacts on positive work outcomes and intentions to remain with the organisation 
(Ahmad & Schroeder, 2002). However, app-work predominantly ignores this concept, both in 
terms of ‘person-job’ and ‘person-organisation’ fit (Carless, 2005). For example, there is an 
evident lack of consideration of cultural fit and a limited consideration of technical expertise, 
with seemingly little interest in worker retention on a long-term basis (Friedman, 2014). Of 
course, the socialisation literature identifies the importance of determining the alignment 
between employee and organisation early in the working relationship (Woodrow & Guest, 
2017). Perhaps if gig organisations made more of a concerted effort to ensure ‘fit’ between 
worker and platform, they would move towards reducing labour turnover and retaining its elite 
workers (Campbell, 2018), although their business model currently appears unconcerned with 
such matters. 
 
Furthermore, given the focus on the completion of specific, narrow tasks within most app-
work, investment in training and development opportunities for workers is severely limited or 
non-existent (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). In some cases, workers attend an information 
session or watch online induction videos prior to commencing work. This, in effect, acts as the 
entirety of the training and socialisation processes. As such, aspects of app-work can be viewed 
as bearing resemblance to Taylorism and Fordism, wherein work is fragmented into on-demand 
tasks and workers’ performance is measured closely (McGaughey, 2018). Furthermore, the 
crucial role of algorithmic management at the core of app-work arguably allows greater 
complexity and management of tasks and people than established, long-standing concepts 
(Wood, Graham, Lehdonvirta & Hjorth, 2019). This raises several research questions 
pertaining to the transactional foundations upon which app-work relationships are formed. For 
example, are digital platform organisations entirely unconcerned with recruiting workers that 
fit well within the organisation? If so, how sustainable is the gig economy’s business model in 
terms of retention and high worker turnover, particularly as most organisations withhold any 
development opportunities?  
 
While the transactional aspect of app-work is clearly evident, we argue that this 
conceptualisation may under-appreciate the inherently nuanced structure of app-work, which 
forms a working relationship with a minimum of three parties involved (Wood & Lehdonvirta, 
2019). In particular, arguments that app-work relationships are centred solely around economic 
gain should be challenged, particularly as this ideal may be perceived differently by each party 
involved. For example, emerging evidence signals that app-workers are seeking a more co-
determined and relational work arrangement, populated by opportunities to develop new skills 
useful in furthering their careers, in addition to craving social interaction and networking 
opportunities (Graham et al., 2017; Petriglieri, Ashford & Wrzesniewski, 2018). Consequently, 
psychological contract theory may be useful in this context, as the perception of each party is 
of critical importance and the terms may differ significantly through each individual’s ‘eyes’ 
(Rousseau, 1995). This theory appreciates that one party can perceive a particular relationship 
and expectations that the other does not recognise. Baruch & Rousseau (2019) note that the 
norm of reciprocity, found in traditional employment relationships, may not always be clear 
when multiple parties are involved, each holding different positions and resources. This can 
conceivably be problematic if one party feels that a violation or breach has taken place. Thus, 
while a legal employment contract may be denied by the gig organisation, it is feasible that 
psychological contracts exist and develop, at least from the worker’s perspective. The idea that 
app-workers only seek to work for financial gain appears at odds with recent research and wider 
scholarship on the sociology of work, around the relevance of relational arrangements 
(Woodcock & Johnson, 2018; Wood & Lehdonvirta, 2019). 
 
Shared understandings and reciprocal contributions for mutual benefit are at the core of 
traditional, functional exchange relationships between workers and organisations (Dabos & 
Rousseau, 2004). From the app-worker’s perspective, having no say in how work is assigned 
and how performance is assessed means that the working relationship is less representative of 
one that has been mutually co-determined, and could instead be perceived as a working 
arrangement of subjugation (Harvey et al., 2017). According to organisational support theory, 
employees interpret organisational policies, practices and treatment – such as HRM – as 
indicators of the organisation’s support and commitment to them (Vanhala & Ritala, 2016). 
But, for app-workers, traditional understandings around reciprocity and organisational support 
no longer apply or, at a minimum, are considerably different. In its role as intermediary, the 
digital platform organisation is the only party with full access to and control over the data, 
processes, and rules of the platform (Jabagi et al., 2019).2 If this trend is indicative of future 
developments in the world of work, it represents a significant shift from established 
conceptualisations of the employment relationship. Again, this form of labour management 
raises several worthwhile research questions: Besides the obvious financial implications, why 
do gig organisations typically adopt a ‘hard’ approach to managing their workers? What effect 
would a more co-determined work arrangement, whereby workers have a greater voice, have 
on the working relationship?  
 
The relationship between app-workers and their organisations strays significantly from a 
conventional employment relationship. With multiple, unique sources of dependence across at 
least three parties, app-work constitutes a working relationship in which platforms 
simultaneously generate dependence and determine the rules that shape, afford, and limit 
worker agency (Wood & Lehdonvirta, 2019). Likewise, for most app-workers who encounter 
issues of any type in their roles, their primary point of contact with the platform is by email.  In 
the absence of a human manager, enquiries are handled by support representatives, the email 
equivalent of a call centre, often managed by third parties.  Responses to queries, issues or 
concerns are typically met with automated responses based on an algorithmic assessment of 
key words within emails (Rosenblat, 2018).  Automated responses may be appropriate for 
 
2 In March 2019, a number of Uber drivers in the United Kingdom initiated legal action under the General Data 
Protection Regulation, requiring that the company provide data it holds about them. Specifically, the drivers 
want to know how Uber uses its algorithms to assign work and to track working time. The drivers have 
requested this data to enable them to accurately calculate holiday pay and other pay owed. 
factual enquiries but lack the ability of a human to understand and respond to nuanced issues. 
As debate increases around this complex reimagining of work, controversy surrounding 
working conditions and workers’ rights has led to legal issues and attempts at collective 
industrial action. Despite the provision of some autonomy and flexibility for app-workers, 
ongoing power asymmetries and struggles undoubtedly exist between workers, those 
customers requesting labour, and the platforms that act as both intermediaries and algorithmic 
managers by enabling and managing work processes (Lampinen, Lutz, Newlands, Light & 
Immorlica, 2018). 
 
The industrial relations literature has long focused on the power dynamics of the employment 
relationship (Atchison, 1991; Fudge, 2017; Smith, 2006). In comparison to more traditional 
employment relationships, the power distance between digital platform organisations and app-
workers appears to be weighted in favour of the former. In most cases, app-workers represent 
the party with the least significant power in many aspects of the working arrangement. App-
workers are subjected to sophisticated forms of control, continuous surveillance, and 
anonymous customer ratings, with organisations and customers holding the most dominant 
positions (Pichault & McKeown, 2019). Most platforms and apps are designed to give the 
appearance of offering choice to the worker but this is usually executed in a manner wherein 
platforms directly shape the engagement in such a way that workers are disadvantaged by not 
agreeing, i.e. penalising workers for rejecting tasks or for not working during peak periods 
(Flanagan, 2018). Likewise, many app-work platforms fully exploit the possibility to minutely 
monitor the activities of app-workers in real time, rendering them heavily at the mercy of the 
platform’s instructions, expectations and demands (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). This creates an 
‘always-on’ form of control that some workers perceive as unfair, given their employment 
classification (Gandini, 2018). This has significant implications, in that research already 
indicates that when a power imbalance exists between two or more parties, those in the more 
vulnerable position find it difficult to have their voice heard (Mowbray, Wilkinson & Tse, 
2015), resulting in perceptions of unfair treatment (Van Buren & Greenwood, 2008). 
Algorithmic management fragments work into individual tasks, closely monitors workers, and 
links pay to performance as a means of segregating workers (Healy et al., 2017), leading 
scholars to likening the gig economy to a modern-day, digitalised Taylorism (McGaughey, 
2018). 
 
The well-being of app-workers has emerged as a concern, with app-work frequently 
characterised by health and safety issues, inadequate social protection, troubling management 
structures, and a lack of investment in workers (Vandaele, 2018). Recent research reports that 
some app-workers feel exploited at the hands of organisations as a consequence of having little 
input into how work is assigned or completed (Wood et al., 2019). Accordingly, worker morale 
and well-being undeniably decline (Fleming, 2017). Some digital platform organisations refute 
these claims, arguing that they provide workers with a voice through in-house surveys and 
support groups (Dupont et al., 2018). Uber, for instance, contends that it provides opportunities 
for involvement to its workers through arranging quality improvement courses where workers 
can have their voice heard (Rosenblat, 2018). Likewise, if drivers are at risk of deactivation 
from the platform due to low customer ratings, Uber sometimes offers a training course to 
facilitate improvement. However, there is a fee for attending. Effectively, the cost of low 
ratings for drivers is to pay for your own training. From the organisation’s perspective, 
initiatives like this are in lieu of recognised HR processes, such as training or appraisals, and 
serve as the most appropriate means of managing the unique nature of app-work (Kuhn & 
Maleki, 2017). Such features intimate that HRM in app-work is not focused on the maintenance 
of a relationship between employer and employee, but rather on control and coordination 
(Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). It can therefore be argued that, through algorithmic management, 
the traditional notion of the ‘tyranny of the clock’ has been replaced by the ‘tyranny of the 
algorithm’ (Lehdonvirta, 2018).  
 
The power imbalance in employment relations was central to the origins and rise of the union 
movement and collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is a process whereby workers come 
together to address pressures for undercutting the price of each other’s labour. While collective 
action and reform is an option for gig workers, the very nature of app-work makes this 
especially difficult: the manager is an algorithm, co-workers are independent contractors 
(potentially geographically dispersed and in competition with each other), and the work is often 
carried out in isolation or in contact only with the customer (Prassl, 2018). This undoubtedly 
complicates the organisation of collective action, as workers can be difficult to engage with, 
find and reach. Despite varied success, attempts have highlighted that collective industrial 
action is far from structurally impossible for app-workers (Schiek & Gideon, 2018). Many 
trade unions have sought to engage with app-workers, most famously including GMB in the 
UK and the New York Taxi Worker Alliance, both of whom have brought multiple cases 
against Uber (Johnston & Land-Kazlauskas, 2018). Additionally, there are a host of ongoing 
legal cases proceeding through the courts surrounding app-work platforms, with the majority 
seeking to determine who is an ‘employee’ and who is a ‘worker’ (McGaughey, 2018).  
 
4.2 Work Assignment 
Algorithmic management dictates how work is assigned and commences as soon as app-
workers log-in to the platform. The supposed non-financial reward of app-work is that workers 
are afforded a high degree of flexibility and autonomy by choosing when and where to work 
(Healy et al., 2017). The realities of these claims are, we argue, highly debatable. It is an 
algorithm that identifies the worker who is better or more quickly able to cater to a certain 
customer, thereby allocating gigs amongst workers to ensure the highest level of speed and 
efficiency (Gramano, 2019). Most app-work platforms suggest that they are merely in the 
business of ‘matching’ workers with customers that request services (Prassl, 2018). However, 
this portrays a further power imbalance. For example, although app-workers operating on 
courier and ride-hailing platforms are not paid while waiting to be assigned tasks, platforms 
still gather and generate useful data and analytics from workers on ‘dead miles’ (i.e. driving 
while waiting for tasks to appear, but not being paid to do so), thereby enhancing its algorithms 
(Thomas, 2018). Accordingly, with potential issues of a power imbalance in the context of 
work assignment, what are the ethical implications of the intense algorithmic control exercised 
by platforms? More specifically, how transparent is the process by which work assignment 
algorithms are formed and updated using app-workers’ data?  
 
Although regularly advertised as a key benefit of app-work roles, the realities of the autonomy 
in choosing when to work and which tasks to accept is more limited than often claimed (Wood 
et al., 2019). Most platforms employ a range of strategies to ensure that jobs are accepted as 
quickly as possible. For example, ride-hailing platforms often do not reveal passengers’ 
destinations to drivers until after the trip has been accepted (Cunningham-Parmeter, 2016; 
Prassl, 2018). Likewise, many platforms are known to penalise workers who do not maintain 
high acceptance rates for tasks offered. For example, Uber has been known to designate drivers 
as unavailable for work if three consecutive rides are declined (Steinberger, 2018). Uber also 
stimulates oversupply in times of potentially high demand by algorithmically urging drivers to 
temporarily relocate and benefit from ‘surge-pricing’. During periods of excessive demand 
when there are not enough drivers on the road and customer wait times are long, Uber increases 
its normal fares. Drivers, however, may be offered ‘non-surge’ priced trips once they arrive at 
the location, and may subsequently be penalised if they decline the trip, despite having 
absorbed the costs of travelling to the location (Rosenblat, 2018). Algorithms also identify 
future periods of potentially high demand, with drivers notified via the app that, for example, 
they are likely to earn above average fares if they work the upcoming Friday and Saturday. If 
the monetary benefit is not quite as substantial as promised, this may constitute a breach of 
their psychological contract. 
 
The gig economy has pioneered algorithmic techniques of worker control, such as behavioural 
nudges and scheduling prompts, based on volatile real-time and predictive analytics that 
produce economic incentives intended to allocate workers to high-demand areas (Van Doorn, 
2017). In theory, workers can choose when to work and they can also operate on more than 
one platform simultaneously, which may pose health and safety concerns given the lack of 
oversight on hours worked. However, many app-workers are encouraged to keep high 
acceptance rates through occasional promotions that offer higher pay (Lee et al., 2015). 
Likewise, when a worker is ready to finish work, algorithmic control again becomes apparent, 
as workers on some platforms are often enticed to earn more money by staying active on the 
app while customer demand is high (Prassl, 2018). 
 
As supposed independent contractors, app-workers should be free to avail of promises to 
choose when to work and which tasks to accept. Yet, for most app-workers, platform control 
via algorithmic management heavily limits autonomy. In reality, workers must work long hours 
and at peak times to garner high earnings and maintain good ratings and are often left with little 
choice but to accept whichever tasks are offered (Prassl, 2018). Thus, for most platforms, rather 
than simply ‘matching’ workers and customers, they instead act as digital work intermediaries 
that use algorithms to tightly manage a large, invisible workforce (Prassl, 2018).  Therefore, 
any ideal of individuals possessing full flexibility of their own work schedule may be rare, 
though empirical evidence is required to establish how extensive this is. Accordingly, we pose 
the following research questions: As worker autonomy often appears more limited than 
advertised, what are app-workers’ experiences of work assignment processes? Is there 
variability in these experiences across different organisations? Likewise, if app-workers are 
penalised or disadvantaged for exercising the autonomy promised to them, what are the 
implications of this potential psychological contract breach for the working relationship?  
 
4.3 Performance Management 
The means through which platforms exercise algorithmic control over app-workers’ 
performance are many and varied, and, as a result, are central in approaches to performance 
management. Once ‘active’ on an app, platform control and associated monitoring takes hold 
in an intensive way (Prassl, 2018). For example, GPS systems can be used to monitor the speed 
and position of vehicles, along with tracking every movement of app-workers, and, 
consequently, can verify what an individual is doing. The Uber app tracks workers’ GPS 
locations and has acceleration sensors built into the driver’s version of the app to detect heavy 
braking and speeding (Prassl, 2018). These data, along with customer ratings and reviews, are 
then used to identify the best performing workers and to alter the algorithm that assigns tasks 
to workers. However, much like the work assignment processes, there appears to be limited 
transparency and understanding about how exactly these algorithms are altered, by whom, and 
under whose instruction.  
 
Several platforms issue performance metrics to app-workers, which often include comparisons 
to other workers and to overall performance rankings, as a means of ensuring high levels of 
productivity (Van Doorn, 2017). Additionally, most platforms utilise customer ratings of 
workers via anonymous systems as a means of performance evaluation. Before being shared 
with workers, assessments are forwarded to platforms, who have the opportunity to verify – 
albeit indirectly – the quality and punctuality of the service rendered (Gramano, 2019). The 
importance of these ratings ultimately leads to further informal or ‘soft’ platform control 
(Wood et al., 2019), by way of driver behaviours in terms of offering customers bottled water, 
phone chargers, and similar ‘extras’ in order to receive high ratings. All such extras are at the 
expense of individual workers. 
 
‘Harder’ platform control approaches are utilised to create high-performance expectations and 
the need to satisfy organisational and customer needs. For example, Uber previously operated 
immediate ten-minute deactivation periods for drivers who repeatedly refused less profitable 
trips (Prassl, 2018). This sanction is derived through data generated via the platform, and as 
such is automatic and immediate. These approaches appear to be highly effective in eliciting 
strong performance levels, with workers striving to maintain above-average ratings for fear of 
being deactivated from platforms (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). The pursuit of high-performance 
levels may come at the expense of worker safety, with recent research highlighting the 
implications of pressurised working environments on some app-workers’ health and well-being 
(Wood et al., 2019). Consequently, regulation may be required to mitigate against the 
potentially detrimental effects of monitoring on app-work platforms.  
 
As the platform has the opportunity to exercise penetrating control over all aspects of the 
service delivery, the worker can be described as being in a situation comparable to a permanent 
probationary period (Gramano, 2019). Indeed, such is the potential intensity of monitoring and 
control in app-work that it could be described as possessing characteristics of an electronic 
panopticon (Prassl, 2018) that goes far beyond what one thought possible in the past (Dagnino, 
2017). The panopticon, associated with the philosopher Bentham, refers to a central tower that 
can observe occupants without them knowing fully whether they are being watched. This may 
lead to an assumption amongst workers that they are under constant observation, thereby 
impacting their behaviour.  
 
A potential danger arising from the use of algorithms in managing workers is that such 
extensive data becomes viewed as a reliable and objective truth, eroding any scope for human 
interpretation of the nuances of workplace behaviour. This is problematic, given the inherent 
weaknesses in simplistic and entirely quantitative measures of performance. Likewise, we are 
also learning that algorithms can contain significant biases (Guszcza, Rahwan, Bible, Cebrian 
& Katyal, 2018). Given the fundamental role of customer ratings, and that workers in receipt 
of low ratings are potentially subjected to being deactivated for future work (Tran & Sokas, 
2017), such concerns are magnified. For example, in some cities, Uber drivers with an average 
rating, calculated by an algorithm, of lower than 4.6 out of a possible 5 are at risk of disbarment 
from the platform (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017). These levels of control perhaps provide context as 
to why the majority of drivers do not seek to remain with the organisation in the long-term, as 
exemplified by reports suggesting that 11 per cent of drivers become inactive within the first 
month, while only 4 per cent remain on the platform for longer than one year (McGee, 2017).  
 
When app-workers are disbarred, the reasoning is often unclear, as is any potential scope for 
reinstatement with the lack of an appeals process. Indeed, the way that sanctions are applied 
based on ratings is often unpredictable and arbitrarily employed (Prassl, 2018). The lack of 
human interaction in seeking to address such issues is noteworthily absent and troubling 
(Kirven, 2018). Given that app-workers are unlikely ever to actually meet their ‘employers’ or 
a line manager, performance management in the gig economy is a substantially different 
concept compared to more traditional work roles (Barley, Bechky & Milliken, 2017). This 
leads us to ask what processes, if any, exist to allow workers to challenge customer evaluations? 
The accuracy of these processes raises concerns for worker protection and for allowing 
recourse to a perceived unfair rating (Vandaele, 2018). If ratings are treated as sacrosanct and 
app-workers have no ability to provide context or an alternative account, their earning capacity 
is ultimately at the peril of unknown customers.  
 
There are many occasions where an app-worker’s performance evaluation may be strongly 
impacted by circumstances outside of their control, given that multiple parties exist in the 
working relationship and success is dependent on all parties fulfilling their obligations (Alcover 
et al., 2017). Consider the working arrangement within food-delivery platforms, such as 
Deliveroo or UberEats, for example. For illustration, if the restaurant supplied the courier with 
the wrong order, he or she would then be confronted with an unhappy customer upon delivery. 
If the courier had not been sufficiently trained to deal with difficult customers, he or she may 
perceive that this error and subsequent aggravation from the customer constitutes a violation 
of the exchange agreement. This encounter may then disrupt delivery metrics or result in a 
complaint, and as a result the worker’s performance report is impacted (Kuhn & Maleki, 2017), 
potentially resulting in the worker voluntarily ending his/her relationship with the platform or 
being less likely to receive future gigs. From the organisation’s perspective, an error from 
another party in the working arrangement could result in the untimely exit of a worker or in 
less use being made of a strong performer.  
 
5. Conclusion: Looking Forward 
 
The gig economy is a small, but growing component of the global labour market. This ‘new’ 
economy has been embraced by customers. While welcomed by some workers, it does, 
however, represent a further trend towards precarious working. Existing conceptualisations of 
gig working have, we argue, resulted in some misleading classifications and conflation of what 
gig work entails and the size of this economy. Having identified the crucial role of technology 
in facilitating work in the gig economy, we propose that distinguishing app-work from other 
variants of gig work represents an important first step to a more coherent typology of gig 
workers, which, in turn, is central to better understanding the issues such workers face and the 
implications for HRM and the employment relationship. Moreover, this is also important for 
public policy-making bodies, who are being asked to consider appropriate protections in 
several jurisdictions (Berg, 2016; Friedman, 2014).  
 
While most gig organisations deny the existence of an employment relationship, the strict 
levels of control enforced by many app-work organisations via algorithmic management raises 
noteworthy contradictions that warrant developed empirical consideration (Kuhn & Maleki, 
2017). Conflict between app-workers and organisations on issues surrounding control, 
dependency, and working conditions, for example, would suggest that there is more to the 
working relationship than simply remuneration and flexibility (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). In 
other words, app-workers may view their working relationship beyond a merely economic or 
transactional exchange. Although scholarship is beginning to consider and address issues 
around the employment relationship and HRM in the gig economy, there is an under-
theorisation, which is not unexpected in a new domain such as this. According to Jabagi et al. 
(2019), the detached and distributed nature of the gig economy signals a radical reinvention of 
work, embodied by a significant shift towards novel management tools enabled by technology. 
While digital platform organisations typically position themselves as providers of an app, 
functioning simply as a neutral technology platform to match workers with customers, the 
reality appears more likely to be that most platforms act as digital work intermediaries in the 
business of tightly managing a large, invisible workforce (Prassl, 2018). From an employment 
relations and HRM perspective, the gig economy creates a new dynamic where these 
technologies do not just mediate economic and social relations, but also help to co-constitute 
them (Wood & Lehdonvirta, 2019).  
 
The practice of HRM, serving to effectively manage people within organisations, has typically 
been based on the notion of traditional employment. In the absence of a conventional 
employer–employee relationship, app-work arrangements disrupt this conceptualisation. 
Despite the lack of a discernible employment relationship, gig work still incorporates HRM-
like activities, including, but not limited to, managing working relationships, work assignment 
processes, and performance management and evaluation (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). The 
preceding discussion has, for example, considered how the working relationship in app-work 
is established and managed in ways that raise concerns around power imbalances, fairness and 
worker well-being, and in a way that places little value on the development of a deep 
relationship with associated levels of commitment (Healy et al., 2017). Similarly, work 
assignment processes form a complex reimagining, with algorithmic mechanisms contradicting 
claims of supposed flexibility and autonomy (Collier et al., 2017; Harris, 2017). Likewise, with 
its primary focus on quantitative customer ratings and tracking mechanisms, performance 
management is strikingly different from, but no less important to our traditional understanding. 
App-workers are subject to tight levels of control, where the customer evaluation is often 
critical (Healy et al., 2017), and without recourse to question or refute performance scores. 
This arguably results in a generally one-sided process (Flanagan, 2018), which leads to a 
further shift in power away from workers.  
 
The implications of app-work and the pervasiveness of algorithmic management for the HR 
profession needs greater consideration. Some have noted that the gig economy redefines the 
role of HRM away from upholding employment relationships towards the governance of 
exchanges on platforms that serve to allow the co-creation of value for all parties involved 
(Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). Others question the long-term viability of the role of HRM in the 
gig economy, particularly within the strategic context of motivating workers, ensuring high-
quality performance, and providing social support (Jabagi et al., 2019). With algorithmic 
management replacing human supervision across the majority of platforms, organisations must 
instead rely on workers to self-organise and self-motivate to advance task performance and 
organisational goals (Jabagi et al., 2019). HRM activities tend to be outsourced to the system 
designers that develop and manage algorithms, which removes many of the costs of HRM and 
passes employment risks to the individual (Snyder, 2016). This data-dominated approach 
moves work into an inhuman form, with algorithms undertaking roles that were traditionally 
the preserve of HR professionals. The concomitant rise of interest in big data and HR analytics 
may further indicate the removal of the more interpersonal and empathetic aspects of people 
management (Angrave, Charlwood, Kirkpatrick, Lawrence & Stuart, 2016). This raises 
questions around what the HR function serves to do, or how it should act, in these organisations 
(i.e. a HR function that serves permanent staff within the organisation, but has no responsibility 
for ‘independent’ gig workers)? While gig work may bring increased organisational 
productivity, how ethical and appropriate may this be? With the tendency to refuse employee 
rights, HRM may be sleepwalking into the eradication of ethical responsibility (Greenwood, 
2013), for example, in relation to the level of protection and use of individual data, transparency 
and accountability of algorithmic processes, and worker well-being. All things considered, the 
rise in app-work and the all-pervasive role of the algorithm brings a need for a more critical 
consideration of the consequences of this for employment relations and of how HRM, as a 
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Figure 1: Summary of Working Arrangements, adapted from Cappelli and Keller (2013)
Economic Work: 
Activity undertaken for 









Full directive control. 
Direct relationship involving 
two parties: employer and 
employee. 
E.g. full-time employees, part-
time employees, direct-hire 
temporary employees, on-call 
work.
Coemployment:
Shared directive control. 
Indirect relationship involving three 
parties: client organisation, third 
party agency, and worker. 
Fixed-term contracts.
E.g. temporary agency workers, 
professional employee organisations.
Contract Work:
Organisation lacks directive 
control.
Traditional employment 
relationship does not exist, or 
may be complex and 
fractured.
Direct Contracting: 
Direct relationship involving 
two parties: client 
organisation and workers. 
Fixed-term contracts. 
E.g. independent contractors, 
day labourers. 
Subcontracting:
Indirect relationship involving 
three parties: client 
organisation, third party 
(vendor), and workers. 
Fixed-term contracts. 
E.g. vendor on premises.
Gig Work:
Indirect relationship involving a 
minimum of three parties: 
intermediary online platform, 
worker, and customer.
Capital Platform Work:
Platforms used by 





platforms where labour is 
outsourced to a geographically 
dispersed crowd.




that deploy workers on-
demand, where algorithms 
control and mediate work.
E.g. Uber; Lyft; Deliveroo.
 








































*A broken line connects the supplier to other parties to indicate that the supplier only exists 





Assigns tasks to workers 
via apps based on 
demand. 
Mediates and controls 
work via algorithms. 
Customer 
 
End-user of the 
service, who also 
generates demand on 




Exists in certain app-
work arrangements as 
an additional ‘partner’ of 
the online platform/app. 





who works flexibly on a 
piece-rate basis.  
Executes tasks in same 
geographic location as 
customer. 
